In just under two centuries, 81 presidents and 7 military juntas have governed El Salvador under 14 constitutions. Of those heads of state, 24 presidents and one junta were deposed by coups d’état, five other presidents resigned, and one was assassinated. Presidents dictated the first 13 constitutions, while the most recent was signed in 1983 following negotiations with the legislature and revised at the Peace Accords in 1992. By that math, roughly one in four presidencies came to a premature end, and the country saw a new constitution, on average, every thirteen years.
Battles for control of the economy and state have formed political cycles of fleeting rulers and weightless constitutions, except in five cases: the constitution of 1824, which defined the state; that of 1841, which proclaimed the state a republic; that of 1886, which defined the republic’s liberalism; and that of 1983, which set checks and balances. In essence, the rest were drafted to permit the reelection of sitting presidents.
In the past century, El Salvador has weathered eight political cycles: the Meléndez-Quiñónez dynasty (1913-31), the dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (1931-44), the modernism of the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD), the welfare-state of the National Reconciliation Party (PCN), the reformism of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the neoliberalism of Arena (1989-2009), the progressivism of the FMLN (2009-2019), and the emergent authoritarianism of Bukele. Excluding the most recent, each cycle lasted one to two decades and each, except the first and last, issued correctives that, while outweighed by their blunders, sought to prolong its life.
Martínez created the Central Reserve Bank and the Mortgage Bank, among others. The PRUD created the Salvadoran Social Security Institute and the Urban Housing Institute. The PCN created the National Public Pension Institute (INPEP) and the Regulatory Institute of Supplies, a now-defunct manager of agricultural surplus and deficit. The PDC shepherded agrarian and banking reforms. Arena created the Consumer Advocate and the Solidarity Network. The FMLN created the Temporary Income Assistance Program and instituted a universal basic pension. None of these reforms, with the exception of the agrarian and banking reforms, touched the oligarchy. In spite of the reforms, each cycle was eventually cut short—the first three in the streets, due to political instability in response to the concentration of power and the disproportionate use of force; and the last three at the ballot box due to thwarted expectations.
Relative to Bukele’s predecessors, today there is no oligarchy with the political clout required to conspire against the president. There is, though, an increasingly emboldened army that could, as seen in the past, pose such a threat. There is no organized resistance in civil society, but neither are there the resources to incubate such a movement. There is no armed insurrection, nor is there money to face one. There is no foreign exchange, but international money is flowing to the pandemic response. There is no U.S. administration pushing for institutionality, but that could quickly change. All of this amid undeniable public support and a historically unmatched management of the national agenda.
This cycle will last as long as Bukele can successfully manage those dichotomies. Just over a year after taking office, he seems to have the wherewithal to pull it off, though he is already showing early symptoms that leave room for doubt, such as falling economic growth and rising debt. The shortage of political will to address these problems has deepened amid the protracted and unsustainable fallout of the pandemic. In economic terms, the crisis has already exacted a heavy toll; it’s also just beginning to reverberate across the political landscape.
Bukele has made clear through his actions that he will not be slowed by checks and balances established in the current constitution, a document which hasn’t resolved the country’s deepest structural problems but which has ushered in the longest era of unsullied elections and uninterrupted presidential terms in history. Until a year ago, during the least traumatic period in two centuries, the constitution helped mediate disputes between sitting governments and the opposition.
Approving a new constitution, as members of the president’s inner circle have insinuated and his most fervent supporters have demanded, will likely not have the effect of reforming the state or economic model or maintaining the checks on power of the past 37 years. Rather, on the basis of what has been seen over the past year and the judgment of some analysts, it could happen with the intent to bestow absolute power on the president, open the door for reelection as in the cycle of Martínez, or, alternatively, allow power to rotate hands in the Bukele clan as in the Meléndez-Quiñónez cycle.
If Bukele fails to carve out a majority in the Assembly to reform the constitution or govern unfettered, his legitimacy will wane, his popularity will be in jeopardy, and he will be forced to make concessions or accept the fate of ungovernability. If he gets his way he also stands to lose, as conflict will rise hand-in-hand with instability and potentially lead to an unwinding of his presidency, as in the case of 30 of his predecessors whose terms were cut short or others who fizzled out.
Just one year into each cycle, the end seemed unimaginable. It was the citizens in the streets or at the ballot box—not the governments by decree or by social media—who brought each to a close. In 2021 Salvadorans will decide whether or not to give Bukele absolute power and will set the foundation for the future unwinding of the current cycle.
Joaquín Aguilar is a Salvadoran sociologist with a degree in political science from the Central American University, a master’s degree in business administration from the Superior Institute of Economics and Business Administration (ISEADE - FEPADE) in El Salvador, and a doctorate in international cooperation from the University of the Basque Country in Spain. He served as governor of the department of La Libertad under Mauricio Funes (2009-14).
*Translated by Roman Gressier
