Last week, the Honduran digital outlet Contracorriente published correspondence between prosecutors in Honduras and Colombia from 2012, in which the Colombians shared evidence of the family of now-presidential advisor Manuel “Mel” Zelaya’s potential involvement in drug trafficking. In early September, the outlet revealed that three businesses named in the U.S. drug trial of former president Juan Orlando Hernández’s brother Tony continue to receive contracts from the administration of current President Xiomara Castro, or have done business with officials in it.
This followed InSight Crimes’ jarring release on September 3 of video footage displaying Zelaya’s brother Carlos, or “Carlón”, in a 2013 meeting with members of the Cachiros drug cartel to discuss possible campaign payments that year to current President Xiomara Castro, compounding the multiple U.S. courtroom testimonies accusing the Zelaya brothers Mel and Carlón of having had past ties to drug traffickers.
Sizing up this spate of revelations, journalist Jennifer Ávila, the editorial director of Contracorriente who last year was awarded the Gabriel García Márquez Award for Excellence, says “they portray the narcostate that has long existed.” But, she notes, they have not catalyzed public demonstrations. “For people to demonstrate, an issue must unite enough people and willpower, and that is not the case with narcopolitics alone,” she argues, explaining that drug trafficking influence has been too pervasive in Honduran national life for too long.
The Xiomara Castro administration has responded to these articles by driving the already fraught political turmoil in Tegucigalpa to a fever pitch, accusing journalists of conspiring with the opposition and the U.S. government to deal a coup d’état with 14 months left until the national elections. State-aligned social media smear campaigns, following the tune of senior cabinet officials, have also doxed Contracorriente’s offices, she denounces, and the Minister of Strategy and Planning has accused the outlet of possible sedition for its reporting.
Ávila spoke with El Faro English in the Historic Center District of Guatemala City. In this interview, she also addresses the challenges of conducting investigative journalism in Honduras, a country dominated by a historically partisan and polarized press. “The tradition is for journalists to be corrupt: to be on the take from Congress or the President’s Office,” she says. “It is hard for people to understand that journalism must question power, regardless of who wields it.”
In the last two weeks, Contracorriente has published two investigations on the Castro-Zelaya circle. InSight Crime released another. If we take these parts together, what do they illustrate about Honduras?
They portray the narcostate that has long existed. It was not limited to the Juan Orlando Hernández government; its cogs are far more intricate, extending to political parties, mayors, and local caudillos [strongmen]. It cannot be eradicated merely by extraditing the former president, who was convicted in the United States. In Honduras there has yet to be justice.
How has Honduran society received these recent revelations?
Recently, the Jesuits’ Reflection, Research, and Communication Team (ERIC-SJ) did a survey on the country’s main problems, and the largest portion of people named the economy —poverty— followed by violence. Drug trafficking was among the lowest rankings. This is a society controlled for so many years by mafias big and small. The gangs who control the barrios are connected to drug cartels, and the political caudillos who have spent decades in power are connected to the cartels and the gangs, etcetera. People are accustomed to that type of control, and to the absence of the state in their territories. Some are upset when politicians close to the Presidency are directly tied to drug trafficking, which is the case of Carlón Zelaya, but perhaps they are in the city, or aren’t used to seeing the narcostate up close. There is indignation on social media, but no demonstrations. For people to demonstrate, an issue must unite enough people and willpower, and that is not the case with narcopolitics alone.
The issue seemed to bring people together in 2021. There was a vote in repudiation of Juan Orlando Hernández and the project that he headed.
Juan Orlando had been accumulating negatives since 2015. The repudiation began with corruption, not drug trafficking. Then came the 2017 elections. People in Honduras do not favor presidential reelection, and he imposed himself that year. In 2018, his brother Tony was arrested on drug charges. It was after his reelection that narcopolitics began to take a toll. Obviously, this all had an impact on the 2021 election, but it was not only about the narcostate.
Turning to the present, you’re saying you don’t believe there are enough elements of discontent for the journalism on the group in power’s drug ties to mobilize people.
I don’t think so. This is the first time that a party that purports to be of the Left governs in Honduras. They have been in power for three years and have made many mistakes, but we have not seen much public indignation. For example, the state of exception, as a measure to reduce violence, has been a huge farse. The massacre of the 46 women in the Támara Prison was the first time that a tragedy like that occurred in a women’s facility. But not even that was enough for the public to call for an end to the state of exception. There has been a significant erosion and fragmentation of the social fabric in Honduras.
The government also brought a sizable part of the social movements into the public sector, and has used state resources to organize its base: The program is called Popular Power, run by one of the Secretariats of the Executive Branch. There is also fear of greater confrontation in the barrios in the event of protests. It’s a more psychological form of repression: The first time that it appeared there would be a demonstration convened by anti-corruption movements, the government convened its own march with the ruling party the day prior. What happened? The anti-corruption march stayed home, because the government event invoked a violent discourse, as if to say, ‘The streets are ours. Only we can protest in the streets.’ And they rolled out the entire state bureaucracy and used public resources to mobilize people.
People continue to consume journalism, too, from their partisan trenches.
Of course. But in Honduras we have seen spikes where journalism has been important to the broader public. In 2015, during the opposition movement Los Indignados, digital journalism was very important because people got their information from social media, and that is how marches were convened. The 2017 reelection was another key moment. Everything could be seen —the human rights violations, repression, etcetera— on social media. At the same time, we now receive more tips on social media. There is also a community of Honduran migrants in the United States on TikTok who cite the journalism we are doing in Honduras in their live streams.
What is it like to do journalism in a country where the traditional press has very close and historic ties to the political parties?
It’s difficult, because they control the media in Honduras and television and radio are still where people get their information. Only one or two percent of the population reads digital outlets; what a gigantic disadvantage! Our task is also for the Honduran public to understand what journalism should be. The tradition is for journalists to be corrupt: to be on the take from Congress or the President’s Office. It is hard for people to understand that journalism must question power, regardless of who wields it.
We investigated Juan Orlando’s caudillos, and now Mel Zelaya’s. When we started investigating Juan Orlando, we began with his caudillos in rural areas. And now I believe we are the outlet that has published the most about Libre’s caudillos. The mayor of Tocoa, Adán Fúnez, is in the eye of the hurricane right now, as he was in the video [published by InSight Crime] with Carlón Zelaya. We had revealed Fúnez’s ties to the mafias some time ago.
The Central American Network of Journalists recently denounced that Contracorriente has suffered threats and smear campaigns. Is the newsroom safe?
Our work relating to nepotism, the lack of transparency, and the misappropriation of public funds by Congress or their use for political campaigns has angered the government. We revealed plans to construct a prison on an island without an environmental license or scientific study, contrary to their claims. Since the start the administration has labeled us as an enemy because we receive U.S. funding. The minister of Strategy and Planning, Ricardo Salgado, has also accused us on his X account of promoting a coup d’état, sedition, and betraying the nation. Every time the minister says something, government-aligned social media accounts are activated. Some are more violent, threatening me or editor-in-chief Fernando Silva. They have also exposed the location of our office.
Is Contracorriente facing lawsuits?
They have not sued us for now, but there have been threats. We have published multiple articles about the Institute for Public Sector Employee Retirement, which is directed by Amable de Jesús Hernández, a very important political caudillo for the Castro administration and for the party in western Honduras. He threatened to sue us, but has not been able to move forward because there are no grounds for it.
Before the Castro-Zelaya family returned to power, Contracorriente had more access to party information and members. My impression is that now that access is minimal.
Yes, totally. They no longer answer our interview requests.
Honduras is one of the most lethal countries for journalists and human rights defenders. Since 2000, more than 100 journalists have been murdered. Successive governments have failed to implement the state protection mechanism. Why is that?
Most of the protection mechanism’s budget is spent on protecting public officials, despite the fact that they have their own mechanism. There are journalists with protective measures, but they are insufficient: many journalists and rights defenders face aggression from the police and therefore do not want a police escort. There is no consensus on how to manage the precautionary measures and people have long struggled to make a complaint and request protection. A prosecutor’s office was created to investigate the killings of journalists and defenders, but they have only five prosecutors in the whole country, so the cases go to the Prosecutor’s Offices for High Impact Crimes or Crimes against Life, which lack the perspective to investigate these cases. In the end, the measures have been completely useless and most journalists left unprotected are those who work in rural areas, reporting on mayors or legislators.
The political crisis in Honduras appears to be the deepest since the JOH years. Did journalistic revelations light the fuse?
It was deepened by the recent revelations of drug ties, but the crisis of trust began on Xiomara Castro’s first day in office, with the taking of the National Congress by Libre. The party had already shown its fissures, but that was when it broke. The denunciations of nepotism and the approval of a political amnesty covering corruption-related crimes also contributed. The government’s communication has been incapable of putting out the fire. When the National Anti-Corruption Council presented its study on nepotism, the government responded by coordinating a smear campaign. We revealed it, and they didn’t even deny it. They are incapable of stopping the crisis, and it would appear that there is a strategy to deepen it.
They have cast their critics as coup-mongers for some time. But now the stove seems particularly hot. Could this conflict lead to a break in government?
It’s more of a talking point. The only thing that matters to them is winning the elections in November of next year. To that end, Xiomara Castro has a fund to do public works, especially infrastructure. If more corruption cases come to light, the government could radicalize, because its objective is for its political project to continue for many years, as stated in the name of the party: “Refoundation.” But anything could happen. Experience shows that in Honduras political violence and conflict greatly increase one year before election season. In 2021, there were a number of killings of candidates tied to drug trafficking and other mafias. This climate got worse after the 2009 coup, but given the government’s rhetoric, it could become even more grave.
How is Contracorriente preparing for next year’s contest?
We are investigating. There will be lots of noise, lots of disinformation. The best tool that people can have is information: for us to let them know where the campaigns are coming from, to tell the stories of people who put their trust in us by denouncing what is going on in their barrios. There is too much confusion and fear, and too many public resources invested in state media outlets to generate violent propaganda. Journalism must also explain where that manipulation comes from, and what things are being hidden. And that is what we will do.
