As conflicts continue to cause immense suffering in the Middle East, in Myanmar, in Sudan, in Ukraine, and in many other places, one question we often hear is: What can international actors do to help end these conflicts? It was the search for answers to a specific version of this question that brought me to El Salvador: How can external mediators assist warring parties to negotiate a peace agreement?
The process that led 33 years ago to the momentous signing of the Peace Accords in El Salvador still has much to teach us today about how peace is made.
The events remain sufficiently recent that many of those who were closely involved are still able to share their experiences. After speaking with many of them, and spending many hours in the archives, I found that there are still many lessons to be gleaned. I would like to share three that I think are particularly important for international mediation.
The source of a mediator’s power
A mediator’s power derives from their ability to get negotiating parties to arrive at a common framing of a situation. Their job is to help the parties reach agreement. We might think that warring parties are only likely to respond to a combination of carrots and sticks in order to get them to agree. However, research has shown that most mediators do not actually have a lot of carrots and sticks at their disposal. And even when they do, agreements reached through these methods tend not to last. Parties will go back to behaving badly once the carrot or the stick disappears. Mediators have little direct influence over events or the material circumstances that the parties find themselves in. What they can do is persuade the parties, and other actors with influence, of a particular interpretation of these events and circumstances.
An example from the early stages of the peace process illustrates this idea. Before the UN began facilitating the process, two rounds of dialogue between the government and FMLN took place in September and October 1989. However, following the bombing of FENASTRAS, talks broke down, the FMLN launched its November 1989 offensive, and at the Universidad Centroamericana, six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter were murdered.
Today, there is widespread consensus that the events of November opened the path to renewed negotiations. Yet accounts from the time make clear that there were differing interpretations of the situation. Many, including the FMLN, believed that the November offensive had demonstrated that the FMLN was a stronger fighting force than the government had thought and could not be defeated militarily. However, other voices, particularly in the Salvadoran military, argued that the offensive had ultimately failed in its objective of toppling the government and that therefore the FMLN could be defeated.
The events of November were therefore not enough for both sides to agree to begin negotiations. It was only through a careful dialogue with representatives of both sides in the months of December 1989 and January 1990 that the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative Álvaro de Soto was able to bring both the government and the FMLN to a common understanding that the time was now ripe for negotiations.
Breaking impasses
The second lesson relates to how a mediator helps to break impasses in negotiations. It is not unusual for negotiations to get stuck, either because parties believe agreement is not possible, or because they are taking a hardline position to try and gain a negotiating advantage. Whether genuine or tactical, if an impasse persists too long there is a risk that the negotiations will collapse. Momentum is the lifeblood of negotiations. If things stop moving forward, people begin to lose faith that a deal can be done. In these moments of impasse, the presence of a mediator really counts.
Evidence from the El Salvador negotiations suggests that the mediator helps parties to break the impasse, not always on the issue they were stuck on, but by helping them to adapt their framework for negotiating. The original framework for the El Salvador peace negotiations was established by the agreement signed in Geneva on Apr. 4, 1990. However, once negotiations got underway, impasses repeatedly arose. To overcome them, the negotiation framework had to be repeatedly adjusted. Again, an example can help to illustrate this.
An early impasse arose around the issue of reform of the armed forces, which was the first item on the negotiation agenda. With no progress on the issue being made over several rounds of negotiations, by July 1990 the parties had declared they were at an impasse. What unlocked the impasse was the suggestion from the mediator, that they abandon their agreed sequence of issues to be negotiated and rather switch to discussing human rights. The parties agreed, negotiations restarted, and an agreement on human rights was quickly reached. This first substantive agreement of the negotiations helped to bolster confidence in the process and restore momentum.
Qualities of an effective mediator
The third lesson concerns what makes a good mediator. In studying the role of the United Nations in El Salvador, three factors emerged as crucial to its success: expertise, legitimacy, and opportunity.
A mediator’s expertise is a combination of skills and knowledge. The United Nations mediation team combined skills of communication and persuasion with knowledge of the context and culture of El Salvador and of the subjects being negotiated. While Álvaro de Soto was an accomplished individual in his own right, his skills and knowledge were complemented by a series of other distinguished individuals. It was the expertise of the team as a whole that helped to make the United Nations such an effective mediator.
Legitimacy depends firstly on the standing of the mediator. Are they someone who is listened to and respected by influential actors? Secondly, it requires the mediator to have credibility. They need to be seen as keeping their word, to work in an impartial manner, and to have an ability to build personal relationships of trust with the individuals they are dealing with. While relations between Álvaro de Soto and his interlocutors in the El Salvador and U.S. governments were not always the warmest, and he was at times accused of favoring the FMLN, the standing and credibility that he and his team enjoyed with a wide range of actors meant that their legitimacy was never undermined.
Finally, the potential of a mediator’s expertise and legitimacy will be only realized if they meet the right actors at the right time. Opportunities do not only arise, but they are also created. This requires resources and networks of relationships. As a global international organization, these are things that the U.N. had in relative abundance, contributing to its ultimate success in El Salvador.
By understanding the sources of a mediator’s power, how a mediator can help to overcome impasses, and the characteristics that make mediators effective, those supporting mediation efforts in today’s conflicts can be more successful. There are undoubtedly many more lessons from the El Salvador peace process that merit to be more widely known. I therefore end by paying tribute to all those in El Salvador who contribute to discovering and promoting those lessons. This includes the protagonists who regularly agree to be interviewed, the archivists who ensure that documents are preserved and managed, and the journalists and academics who continue to research and publish new insights. The rest of the world must not forget what was achieved in El Salvador.
Owen Frazer is a conflict resolution scholar and practitioner based in Switzerland. In his 20-year career he has worked on multiple conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. His book, “Reframing Peace Mediation: Overcoming Negotiation Impasses in El Salvador,” was published last year.
