On the heels of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election last week, Central America is holding its breath. With his return to the White House, critical civil society groups who are documenting grave human rights abuses under the Salvadoran state of exception, or who last year denounced Guatemalan prosecutors’ assault on the electoral process, are suspicious of greater authoritarian synergy in the region: In his second term, the U.S. president-elect has threatened to punish his foes and purge from the civil service those who would obstruct his agenda. He has also proposed the deportation of millions of immigrants to their home countries, once again hardening immigration policy toward undocumented communities —among them, parts of the Central American diaspora— and labor force.
Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica from 2010 to 2014 and a front-row actor to this day in regional politics, laments that “relations are totally fragmented in Central America, which strengthens Trump’s transactional politics.” She told El Faro, via videoconference during a public panel at the Central American Journalism Forum on Saturday, November 9, that for Trump “the defense of a common agenda does not matter; only whether countries fulfill his strictly national interests.” She also anticipates “a contagion from the United States to Latin America, which will without a doubt deepen even further the democratic decay in our region.”
Emily Mendrala, who until weeks ago was a senior advisor to Joe Biden on migration, accompanied Chinchilla from the forum stage in Antigua Guatemala. “In the immigration enforcement system there is a severe lack of resources,” she underscored. “In the early days he will very visibly display what he is doing, but I doubt he will be able to do it at the level that he has promised.” Mendrala, who also served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Central America, said between the lines that she expects financial cuts to civil society. “I also fear that many people will leave for retirement,” she added, referring to U.S. diplomacy and other federal areas. In the region, she asserted, “we will see an anti-corruption policy set on a greatly country-by-country basis, depending on the president, his advisors, and each government.”
Where does Central America fit on Donald Trump’s map of the world?
EM: In a word, the effect of the U.S. elections for Central America will be unpredictable. To understand how President Trump will handle foreign policy in his second term, we must look to how he did so in the first. He focused mostly on migration, but in a transactional way. While Biden, too, focused on migration, he did so through alliances and partners in the region. In his first term, the president-elect made commercial threats against Mexico and Central America until he got what he wanted. He even canceled bilateral assistance to Central American countries to obtain their cooperation. This shows his transactional way of working.
His migration policies were harsh and inhumane: the separation of children from their parents at the U.S. border, the Migrant Protection Protocols [better known as Remain in Mexico], and the [safe-third-country] asylum cooperation agreements. He also reduced legal migration to the United States by 45 percent through the refugee program and temporary work visas. He also had a complicated relationship with corruption and democracy.
What does Trump’s promise of mass deportations mean for that other Central American territory, the diaspora? Is that even feasible, for U.S. and Central American institutions?
EM: It’s important to know that he won, and with a mandate. He was the first Republican candidate in 20 years to win the popular vote. He knows the federal government and is now more capable of promoting his agenda. He has said that he wants to reduce migration to the United States to zero, speaking of arrivals at the border and people entering through legal pathways. He says he wants to revoke the status of some in the United States temporarily, like recipients of TPS and humanitarian parole. If people in the United States leave their jobs, that could affect the economy. There is a consensus among economists that the arrival of migrants who can legally work has helped to reactivate the U.S. economy. Stripping them of status and deporting so many people would greatly affect an economy still recovering from the pandemic.
Also, many people have been in the United States for decades. Some children do not even know their parents’ birth country. Receiving them well and integrating them into their societies will cost a great deal of money for regional governments and the international community. In the immigration enforcement system there is a severe lack of resources, and we will see what resources they will have to implement this vision, which countries put up resistance, where they put people before deporting them, and in what planes they transport them around the world. Certain countries do not receive their nationals; we will see how his team will negotiate agreements. It will be very difficult to implement. In the early days he will very visibly display what he is doing, but I doubt he will be able to do it at the level that he has promised.
In 2020, Joe Biden promised a more humanitarian policy. But his government continued to expel people during the pandemic, under Title 42, and implemented restrictions on the asylum system. How do you explain the double-speak and rightward turn?
EM: I wouldn’t say there was a turn or double-standard. At the start of the Biden administration, we recovered U.S. values. We treated migrants arriving in the United States with humanity, canceling the family separation program and others that we saw as inhumane. There was a tremendous increase in border arrivals and President Biden sought policies to put things in order. He negotiated with Congress a bill that would give much more resources for immigration enforcement and reform our asylum system, which has been subject to the same laws since 1990, when more than anything adult single men from Mexico came in search of work. Now families come from around the world, including China, Asia, and Africa. We need a reform that truly takes into account the current context at the border.
President Chinchilla: What impact will the U.S. election have in Central America?
LC: More than unpredictable, I would say that Trump is an old hat who we already lived with for four years, and it didn’t go well for us. Eight years ago, Central America did not exist to him except as part of the only problem that he continues to obsess over today: migration. In 2020, the Biden campaign designed a proposal —we can agree or disagree with it— and later a plan for Central America, and it was a relevant sub-region within Latin America. In the case of Trump, Central America simply does not exist, and is reduced to migration. He extended the U.S. border much farther south, and the dehumanization reached such extremes as migrant family separations. Worse yet, migrants have been stigmatized relative to the rest of the North American population.
For over a year, Trump suspended cooperation with Northern Triangle countries through various State Department and USAID projects, negatively affecting vulnerable groups and communities who were receiving that aid. Projects to fight corruption were paralyzed, such as the special commissions in Guatemala, the CICIG, and Honduras [the MACCIH]. Trump disrespected multilateralism when, taking us by surprise and breaking all written and unwritten rules, imposed his candidate at the head of the Inter-American Development Bank.
It’s hard to hope for any change in foreign policy from Trump. There are three fundamental lines that don’t augur any good news: first, nationalism and isolationism; anything that goes against multilateralism harms small nations like those of Central America. Second, protectionism: of the little good in Central America, it is the region most open [to commerce] in all of Latin America. Third, xenophobia. Then there is his transactional style: the defense of a common agenda does not matter; only whether countries fulfill his strictly national interests.
There could also be more fundamentalism permeating his foreign policy: a religious, dogmatic element pervaded the Trump campaign. And that could make his relations with various leaders in Latin America lean more toward promoting alliances based on fundamentalist conservatism. Today Trump appears to be endowed with a religious mission, speaking as if he were a prophet who must guide not only his own people, but others of the world, too. A messianic leader, more conservative, less constrained by the rule of law, and disdainful of the press. A profoundly anti-ethical leader. In Latin America, different religious creeds are gaining ground as part of the culture war, and we are concerned that he might become a vehicle to facilitate the penetration of that way of thinking. There is a contagion from the United States to Latin America, which will without a doubt deepen even further the democratic decay in our region.
How much regional weight will the personalities of Central American presidents and their personal relationships with Donald Trump have?
LC: Latin America is very divided. We stopped traveling together toward regional agendas on shared problems, such as the need today to negotiate the terms of debt with international financial organizations, or facing organized crime, which continues to be a top-tier issue. We also have migration from other continents. Relations are totally fragmented in Central America, which strengthens Trump’s transactional politics.
His foreign policy will also hinge on personalist elements. He is coming back with greater power: the control of both chambers of Congress and the Supreme Court. And he announced that he will make important changes to the federal administration to remove bureaucrats from civil service and put political appointees in their place. That is where there is the risk that his decisions will be guided by personal sympathies between leaders. Those who will most identify with Trump will be demagogic, conservative leaders removed from the defense of democracy.
Ric Grenell, one of the top candidates for secretary of state, traveled to Guatemala months ago and promised to punish U.S. officials for their sanctions policy last year against local political schemes to thwart the election result. Emily, where could corruption fit in Trump’s Central America agenda?
EM: Under President Biden, the United States has used the very limited tools at its disposal in a targeted way, to create space for democratic actors to defend their democracies. The administration has revoked visas trying to strike at the heart of corruption. The team that will take over could continue to use these tools, but they are most useful in alliance with other countries and, as President Chinchilla rightly says, they will have a transactional and personalist agenda. His advisors with whom I have spoken say they believe he will continue doing the same as before. I think we will see an anti-corruption policy set on a greatly country-by-country basis, depending on the president, his advisors, and each government.
President Trump wants to be part of history. He likes to make a deal. He has said that, above all, he wants to break the U.S. system, and that has an effect abroad, too. That’s why many people voted for him, and he will try to do it, as well as eliminating civil service positions. He said today that on his first day he will sign an executive order on disinformation, to seek out actors in the federal system who have worked to categorize information on social media as disinformation, in order to fire them. He is speaking with Elon musk about studying the federal budget to identify possible savings — not only in foreign policy, but also in firing teams who have worked for years, and who create institutional memory. These are fundamental to a transition, too. I also fear that many people will leave for retirement.
In El Salvador, Trump maintained a close relationship with Bukele. Biden arrived and, at first, promised that democracy and the fight against corruption would be essential to relations. But four years later, Biden continues to cooperate with institutions violating human rights and has stayed silent on Bukele’s unconstitutional reelection. How do you read this turn in policy in El Salvador, and what should we expect from Trump?
EM: The day before yesterday, we heard a summary of a call between President-Elect Trump and President Bukele, in which the latter said he is very concerned about the use of USAID funds in Central America. He also pointed to organizations that are defending human rights and democracy. I don’t know how the Trump team took it, but speaking of personalist politics, that could be one concrete point.
For the Biden administration, it has been very difficult. In public as in private, U.S. officials have always said that the protection of civil liberties is important, that the state of exception should be exceptional, and that due process matters above all. The administration also understands that every country has the right to handle their own security situation, and that Salvadorans’ trauma is real. But we cannot run the politics of El Salvador and we have sought points of cooperation: For example, El Salvador just sent soldiers on a peace mission to Haiti. They also signed an agreement to help the environment, which was part of the DFC [International Development Finance Corporation] in the United States. But it is very difficult. I hope there will be changes under the Trump administration, but I do not know.
President Chinchilla, what importance could the factor of ideology have in Trump’s relations with Honduras and Nicaragua?
LC: The concepts of left and right have already become quite irrelevant in the region, and at the global level, but it could be said that the populist Left has more of a presence in the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, due to their alliances with Venezuela and Cuba, for example. It could be a factor that distances them from Trump, but at the same time they are brought together by their leadership styles. Of course, Trump is not Daniel Ortega, but nor is he a leader who can speak with complete forcefulness about the problems that some countries are having with anti-democratic rulers, because Trump has weakened some of the balances that guarantee that we do not advance toward authoritarian scenarios. This is where I do take into account the factor of unpredictability: It will not depend on ideological lines, but rather on a mix of factors in which leadership style will play a part.
The Central American press gathered here endures exile, police repression, illegal espionage, and financial suffocation. To say nothing of civil society. What does Trump’s election mean for freedom of expression and the press?
EM: These are difficult times of uncertainty over whether there will be a change of policy and strategy for those receiving USAID funds. This community has the opportunity to motivate itself and trade strategies. Someone said yesterday that Central American journalism is a bright light. I hope that the press can continue to count on the support of the United States in the coming years.
LC: Part of the democratic decay in the world has to do with the weakening of the reach and influence of civil society. Governments have begun to copy laws like those of Nicaragua, seeking to prevent civil society from receiving international cooperation funds and, in many cases, labeling them as terrorists or destabilizing actors and proceeding to strip them of their legal identity. It is difficult to think that things could go to an extreme in which the United States ends up signing off on this type of measures against civil society, but we are experiencing such abrupt and drastic change that we never imagined.
We are seeing the oldest democracy in our region, which in another era —with its imperfections and all— was a model to follow, devolve to the point that my call is for civil society to not let its guard down. We must strengthen every support network, because in some of our countries the only hope today is the work of civil society.
*Watch the full panel in Spanish, including questions and answers from the public, in the transmission on El Faro’s X account.
